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I QUOTE
By HENRY H. CLARK*
CHAPTER I
"Reason is the life of the Law; nay the common law itself is
nothing else but reason. The law, which is perfection of reason."
-Coke.
"The lawless science of our lawThat codeless myriad of precedent,
That wilderness of single instances."
-Tennyson.
"The law is a sort of hocus pocus science, that smiles in yer face
while it picks yer pocket; and the glorious uncertainty of it of mair use
to the professors than the justice of it."
-Macklin.
"I have endeavored to give place in this volume to everything
which may be necessary to a correct understanding of the opinions of
the court and nothing more. * * * All dissenting opinions will be found
in their connection, and when the bench is not full the fact is noted."t
(No notations to contrary.)
-Judge Hallett, 1 Colo. (1872) preface.
"Counsel in the exercise of their prdfessional rights and discretion
have flooded us with multitudinous exceptions which are strongly suggestive of the pests with which the people of Egypt were plagued to
compel them to free the children of Israel. The exceptions numbered
150."
-Judge Bissell, 4 C. A. 395.
"It was also proper to receive evidence as to the inscriptions on the
boxes. If the production of the thing on which the inscription is found
is indispensable, it would be impossible to proceed in many cases. If a
sign were painted on a house, it would hardly be contended that the
house would have to be produced, nor can it be said that the law converts the court-room into a receptacle for wagons, boxes, tombstones,
and the like, on which one's name may be written."
-Judge
Belford, 2 Colo. 442.
"It occurs to us that sobriety on the part of the judge while determining the interests of litigants is essentially requisite. * * * Can it be
said that an upright judge, a scrupulously fair man, one who appreciates
the dignity of his office, can impartially determine the interests of litigants, and fairly administer the law when in a state of intoxication?"
-Judge
Richmond, 13 Colo. 109.
*Of the Denver Bar.

tAll italics supplied.
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"Having in mind the awful if not unprovoked charges, set forth
in the complaint, and which defendant admits he made against the
plaintiff, we must assume that appellant had adopted St, Paul's theory
that whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth, before we can yield our assent
to this statement of counsel. If this is the language appellant resorts to
when speaking of one towards whom he entertains the best of feeling,
it would be interesting to know what language he would employ if he
had occasion to characterize the conduct of one towards whom he entertained malice or ill will"
-Judge Cunningham, 21 C. A. 651.
"There was no evidence that the tub with which the experiment
was made was exactly similar to the other, nor that the limb of the
witness was sufficiently similar in form to the injured limb of the plaintiff. The testimony was properly rejected." Syll. (Bath-tub case.)
-Judge Morgan, 23 C. A. 529.
"Plaintiff left his horse standing in the alley, not fastened or
secured in any way, and with the lines in such a position that he could
not reach them. The horse started to run away, and the accident was
the result. Ordinary foresight and prudence should have suggested to
the plaintiff that his horse was liable to run. He neglected the dictates
of experience because, as he says, the horse was gentle and kind, and
not in the habit of running away, forgetting that it is the unloaded gun
and the gentle horse that usually go off unexpectedly."
-Judge Bailey, 38 Colo. 300.
"It cannot be said that the fact of leaving the horse unhitched is
in itself negligence. Whether it is negligence to leave a horse unhitched
must depend upon the disposition of the horse, whether he is under the
observation and control of some person all the time, and many other
circumstances, and is a question to be determined by the jury from the
facts in the case."
-Judge Campbell, 39 Colo. 148.
"The thought of the roping, throwing, mauling around and
branding of a branded horse cannot be less offensive to one of a sensitive
mind, or less apt to sear the conscience of a moral public, than the sight
of a horse which has had a few joints of its tail amputated-the same
might be said of the dehorning of cattle." * * *
-Judge Bailey, 40 Colo. 414.
"Two of the jurors state in their affidavits that the petitioner took
them to a saloon and treated them, but that their verdict was not
influenced thereby, and that they did not know they had been doing
wrong. * * * A party who so far forgets his position as a litigant as to
furnish entertainment for jurors who are to pass upon the merits of the
controversy in which he is engaged should not complain if a verdict in
his favor by jurors with whom he has been in such close communication,
and to whom he has furnished drink, is set aside on motion of his
adversary."
. -- Judge Steele, 43 Colo. 221.
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"As inimitably described by Lew Wallace, his hero, Ben Hur,
was driving a race. Two thousand years later Barney Oldfield, midst
like plaudits of the multitude, was driving a race. The one driving a
chariot race, the other driving an automobile race. Both races alike were
hazardous to the driver. Neither intervening time, nor the fact that
the carriage of the one was propelled by Arabian horses of pure blood,
while the carriage of the other was propelled by most delicately adjusted
mechanical power, can alter the plain understanding that each was
engaged in the driving of a race. Neither can all the definitions written
in the centuries between change the common understanding of men that
linked together in thought, these men engaged in driving races."
-Judge Scott, 66 Colo. 391.
"To dismiss this bill because the plaintiff did not take the right
formal step at the start, when the real purpose of that step has been
accomplished, would be to 'twist the strands of precedent into a rope
with which to strangle justice.' "
-Judge Denison, 71 Colo. 33, 38.
"It is not uncommon, we regret to say, for men to become angry
and say things that they afterwards regret, as doubtless is the case with
the attorney in this case. * * * The executor has wrapped his talent in
a napkin and hidden it in the earth and will be surcharged with what
he ought to have gained" (i. e., interest on a bank deposit).
-Judge Denison, 73 Colo. 1.
"It is a very real thing, though not a complete action, and that
an amendment is possible all know, including those who say the contrary. * * * Half a pair of scissors, though a nullity as scissors, is a real
thing, and when we add the other half, is as good a pair of scissors as
if we had had both halves at first."
-Judge Denison, 82 Colo. 343.
"The paper shafts of the honorable dissenting judges are so directed
that they may tend to divert attention from the fact that Kolkman and
his band of marauders stole Charlie Burson's bacon on the hoof. * * *
I have no doubt that the weird admonitions and quizzical warnings
gratuitously bestowed by Mr. Justice Hilliard on the majority members
of the court as to their judicial duties and conduct were well meant, but
this hint that if our opinions do not meet with popular acclaim, we
may be swept away by a coming flood, contains a political philosophy
so pernicious and shocking that it cannot be overlooked. * * * No one
can fail to be entertained by Mr. Justice Hilliard's dissertation on the
subject of French Kings, but what about Charley's hogs?"
-Judge Adams, 89 Colo. 8.
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"I think the case is one of the 'mountain laboring and bringing
forth a mouse.' The mouse of unconstitutionality is probably there,
but I do not like its color. It is too gray, and not recognizable in the
dark. Every one knows, and the majority opinion admits, that we
are going through an experimental period in labor legislation, attended
with litigation, and we might just as well have selected a white mouse,
the kind ordinarily used in experimentation, because the results, are more
easily ascertainable under the microscope of critical analysis."
-Judge Bakke, 104 Colo. 386.
(To be continued in future issues of DICTA.)

Tax Lectures in Pamphlet Form
Thousands of lawyers in all parts of the United States are studying
federal taxation under the national program inaugurated by the American Bar Association's section of taxation and the Practicing Law Institute. As part of this program, a group of twenty tax experts, with
Professor Erwin N. Griswold of Harvard Law School acting as editorin-chief, has prepared a series of twelve pamphlets which present each
major phase of the income, excess profits, gift, and estate tax laws, as well
as tax practice and procedure, including the preparation of tax returns.
These pamphlets average over forty pages each. Among the writers are
the tax experts of some of the largest New York law firms.
As stated by Weston Vernon, Jr., chairman of the section of taxation of the American Bar Association, and Harold P. Seligson, director
of the Practicing Law Institute, in a joint foreword to the first pamphlet:
The program has been prepared especially to meet the needs
of mature practising attorneys. The presentation includes step-bystep explanations of the methods to be employed in handling typical tax matters. The pitfalls which confront the unwary are pointed
out. Discussions of rare cases or fine points have been omitted, so
that the attorneys studying these pamphlets may obtain a basic
understanding of the major aspects of the federal tax system.
This national program of tax training for lawyers was undertaken
by the American Bar Association because of requests which came to it
from all parts of the United States to aid practitioners in familiarizing
themselves with the tax laws. The substantial increase in tax rates and
the vast number of persons who are now subject to the income tax enhances the need of attorneys for a working familiarity with the tax laws.
This knowledge is needed not only to advise clients in the preparation of
their tax returns, but more important to avoid subjecting them to unnecessary taxes in connection with organizing new businesses, selling

